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The current study examined early signs of implicit metacognitive monitoring in 3.5-year-old
children. During a learning phase children had to learn paired associates. In the test phase,
children performed a recognition task and choose the correct associate for a given target
among four possible answers. Subsequently, children’s explicit confidence judgments
(CJs) and their fixation time allocation at the confidence scale were assessed. Analyses
showed that explicit CJs did not differ for remembered compared to non-remembered
items. In contrast, children’s fixation patterns on the confidence scale were affected by
the correctness of their memory, as children looked longer to high confidence ratings
when they correctly remembered the associated item. Moreover, analyses of pupil
size revealed pupil dilations for correctly remembered, but not incorrectly remembered
items. The results converge with recent behavioral findings that reported evidence for
implicit metacognitive memory monitoring processes in 3.5-year-old children. The study
suggests that implicit metacognitive abilities might precede the development of explicit
metacognitive knowledge.
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EXAMINING IMPLICIT METACOGNITION IN 3.5-YEAR-OLD
CHILDREN: AN EYE-TRACKING AND PUPILLOMETRIC STUDY
Metacognitive knowledge and abilities, that is, cognition about
one’s own cognitive activities, play an important role in
human cognitive performances (e.g., Hofer and Pintrich, 1997).
According to classical models, metacognition consists of a mon-
itoring component, which supervises and evaluates cognitive
performances, and a control component, which regulates cog-
nitive activities (e.g., Nelson and Narens, 1990; Kuhn, 2000).
Monitoring one’s own cognitive activities and using this knowl-
edge to guide future activities play an important role in memory
and learning. Several studies have reported positive relations
between metacognitive competencies and knowledge, and per-
formances in memory tasks (e.g., Schneider and Pressley, 1997;
Renner and Renner, 2001; Dunlosky et al., 2005).
Despite the relevance of metacognition for human perfor-
mance, little is known about the early development of metacogni-
tive abilities (cf. Sodian et al., 2012). In fact, most developmental
studies investigating metacognitive competencies have relied on
assessments of explicit metacognitive knowledge and evaluations
in school-aged children (e.g., Hofer and Pintrich, 1997; Veenman
et al., 2006). These studies suggested that metacognitive (moni-
toring) abilities do not develop before the school age and undergo
a slow developmental progression from early school age to ado-
lescence (for a review see Schneider and Pressley, 1997). Yet, a few
studies investigating children’s employment of memory strategies
to aid memory performance, an indirect measure of metacog-
nitive control, have suggested that some metacognitive abilities
might already develop between 4 and 6 years of age (e.g., Sodian
et al., 1986; Schneider and Sodian, 1988).
Motivated by recent findings in the animal literature (e.g.,
Hampton, 2001; Smith et al., 2003; Kornell et al., 2007; Call,
2010), developmental researchers have started to examine the
implicit signs/precursors of metacognitive abilities in younger
children (e.g., Call and Carpenter, 2001; Balcomb and Gerken,
2008; Gerken et al., 2011). Balcomb and Gerken (2008), for
example, relied on an opt-out paradigm to examine early signs
of implicit metamemory in preschool children. They presented
3.5-year-old children with a memory task in which they had to
learn paired associates. In the test phase, children were first pre-
sented with the first of the two items and had the possibility to
skip answering this item. The authors reported that the children
more often declined items for which they displayed worse mem-
ory performance in a subsequent test. The results indicated that
the children were able to evaluate their own memory. This study
provided first evidence for implicit metacognitive performance in
a memory task in children younger than 4 years of age.
Moreover, recently Lyons and Ghetti (2013) presented
3–5-year-old children with a perceptual discrimination task. They
showed that the children selectively withhold responses for trials
in which they reported uncertainty. This suggests that children
are aware of their own knowledge and rely on this evaluation
to strategically volunteer or withhold responses. Taken together,
these behavioral studies indicate an early developing appreciation
of one’s own knowledge state in the preschool period.
The present study aimed at further examining implicit
metacognitive abilities in 3.5-year-old children, employing an
eye-tracking paradigm. Eye-tracking has become a frequently
used, nonverbal measure of young children’s performances (e.g.,
Paulus et al., 2011; De Bordes et al., 2012; Elsner et al., 2012a,b;
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Fawcett and Liszkowski, 2012). In particular, it has been shown to
be a suitable method to investigate young children’s learning per-
formances (e.g., Johnson et al., 2003; McMurray and Aslin, 2004;
Roebers et al., 2010; Paulus and Fikkert, 2012) and, in school-
aged children, also metamemory skills (Roderer and Roebers,
2010). Roderer and Roebers (2010) examined 7–9-year-old chil-
dren’s explicit confidence judgments (CJs) in a memory task.
Additionally, they recorded participants’ fixation time allocation
on the CJ scale. The results showed that older children’s implicit
CJ as measured by their visual fixation differentiated between easy
and difficult items. They allocated more looking time to the parts
of the CJ scale expressing high confidence for easy compared to
difficult or unanswerable items. Moreover, implicit and explicit
CJ were strongly related to each other as indicated by correlations
between implicit and explicit judgments. This study demonstrates
that the analysis of participants’ fixation pattern during their CJs
in a memory task allowed for an assessment of their memory
monitoring. It also shows that in school-aged children implicit
and explicit metacognitive processes were related to each other.
Thus, the study provides evidence that eye-tracking of looking
patterns is sensitive to fast and implicit processes (for reviews see
Karatekin, 2007; Gredebäck et al., 2010), and is therefore suitable
to study metacognitive processes in young children.
Moreover, recent research has shown that pupil dilations open
another window on early cognitive processes already in preschool
children (e.g., Gredebäck and Melinder, 2011; Gredebäck et al.,
2012). In particular, it has been argued that pupil dilations reflect
the intensity of mental processes. Importantly, the subject does
not need to be aware of these processes as pupil dilations have
been shown to be sensitive to implicit or preconscious processing
(Bijleveld et al., 2009; for a recent review see Laeng et al., 2012).
A number of studies demonstrated that pupil dilations are a use-
ful measure of memory processes (for a review see Goldinger and
Papesh, 2012).
Papesh and colleagues (Papesh et al., 2011), for example, pre-
sented adult participants in a study phasewith 80 items (40 words,
40 non-words). In a subsequent test phase, participants listened to
160 items and were asked to make old/new judgments by indicat-
ing their confidence on a 6-point scale (1: very sure new; 6: very
sure old). The authors assessed participants’ pupil size during
the study and the test phase. The analyses revealed that trials,
leading to high confidence ratings, yielded larger pupil size in
the study phase than trials, leading to lower confidence ratings.
Furthermore, the analyses of the test trials showed that pupil size
were larger during correct than incorrect trials, and that larger
pupil size were related to high-confidence choices. This shows that
besides fixation patterns, changes in pupil size are a sensitive mea-
sure to investigate cognitive and, in particular, memory processes.
In particular, it provides evidence that pupil dilations are related
to memory strength and CJs.
To assess memory monitoring in preschool children we pre-
sented children with a paired associate learning task following
the design of Balcomb and Gerken (2008). In a learning phase
children had to learn animal-object pairs. In a test phase, we
presented children with the same animals and assessed their
memory of the associated object. More concretely speaking, they
were asked to choose the correct item amongst four possible
alternatives. Subsequently, they were asked to give an explicit CJ
on a 5-point scale. At the same time, we measured their looking
pattern to the judgment scale as a measure of implicit memory
monitoring. By comparing their explicit answers for correctly and
incorrectly remembered items with their (implicit) looking pat-
terns at the scale, we aimed at examining whether or not the
3.5-year-old children would differentiate between correctly and
incorrectly remembered items.
Given previous results that pointed to limitations of explicit
metacognitive skills in young children (cf. Schneider and Pressley,
1997) we expected no differentiation for correct and incorrect
items in the explicit CJ. However, given the evidence on implicit
metacognitive abilities in behavioral tasks (e.g., Balcomb and
Gerken, 2008) we hypothesized differences in CJs between the
items in the implicit measure, that is, children’s fixation patterns.
More concretely speaking, following the findings of Roderer and
Roebers (2010), we expected participants to allocate more look-
ing time to the parts of the CJ scale expressing high confidence
for correctly compared to incorrectly answered items. Finally, we
analyzed changes in pupil size by comparing children’s pupil size
for the animal in the learning trials and the presentation of the
same animal in the test trials. Given the claims that pupil dila-
tions reflect cognitive processes already in young children (e.g.,
Gredebäck andMelinder, 2011; Laeng et al., 2012) and given find-
ings of pupil dilations for well-remembered items in adults (e.g.,
Papesh et al., 2011), we expected to find pupil dilation for items




The final sample included 12 3.5-year-old children (range: 42–49
months; 7 boys). 5 additional participants were tested but not
included in the final analysis due to refusal to continue the study
(n = 2) or due to procedural and experimental errors (n = 1).
Two further subjects needed to be excluded due to answering all
items correctly. As we compared answers for correctly vs. incor-
rectly remembered items within subjects, the data of these two
subjects did not allow for such a comparison. The participants
were recruited from birth records of the local district adminis-
tration authority. Children were native German speakers from
heterogeneous socioeconomic backgrounds. Informed consent
for participation was given by the children’s caregivers. Parents
received a monetary compensation for travel expenses and the
children a gift for their participation.
STIMULI
The stimulusmaterial followed the design of Balcomb andGerken
(2008) and consisted of 18 item pairs. The material for every pair
consisted of line drawings of an animal (e.g., an elephant) and
an object (e.g., a television), as well as a picture in which ani-
mal and object were presented together. The three pictures were
recorded as video files and audio files were added to them. The
animal movie lasted for 4 s and was paired with a sentence giv-
ing its name (e.g., “Look, the elephant.”). The object clip lasted
for 4 s and was paired with a sentence describing the relationship
between animal and object (e.g., “He likes to watch television.”).
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Finally, the combined movie lasted for 4 s and a sentence repeated
the relationship (e.g., “The elephant likes watching television.”).
The stimulusmaterial of the test phase consisted of the same 18
line drawings and additional items to examine children’s recog-
nition memory as well as their metacognitive judgments (see
Table 1). The trigger item lasted for 6 s. It showed the animal
drawing and was paired with a sentence triggering the object (“Do
you still know what it likes to do?”). The test movie showed the
animal on the left hand side and four possible answers on the
right hand side presented vertically. This movie lasted for 6 s and
was paired with the test question (“What does it like to do?”). A
still frame of the test movie served as test item to assess children’s
answer to the question. Finally, the evaluationmovie lasted for 6 s.
It showed the animal on the left hand side and the CJ scale, which
consisted of five smileys, on the right hand side. The evaluation
clip was paired with a sentence asking for children’s confidence
(“How sure are you?”). The five smileys were vertically oriented
and displayed a very happy smiley on the top and a sad look-
ing smiley at the bottom. The three smileys in-between displayed
gradual changes in the emotional valence. A still frame of the eval-
uation movie served as evaluation item to assess children’s answer
to the question.
PROCEDURE
Children were tested individually in the laboratory and were
seated in front of an eye-tracker. The experimenter explained to
the child that she was going to watch a movie in which the child
will hear stories about animals and their hobbies. All participants
were tested at a viewing distance of approximately 60 cm from
the monitor. During the experiment, the gaze of both eyes was
recorded with a corneal reflection eye-tracker (Tobii T60, Tobii
Technology, Sweden). The eye-tracking system was integrated in




















The first three items were used in the practice trials.
a 17-in (43.18 cm) TFT flat-screen monitor on which the stim-
uli were shown. The apparatus recorded gaze data at 60Hz with
an average accuracy of 0.5◦ visual angle. The movies were pre-
sented using the build-in software Tobii Studio (Tobii Technology,
Sweden).
Practice trials
Three of the 18 items served as practice trials. In the practice tri-
als, the experimenter sat next to the child and served as a model
of how to perform the task. In a learning phase, the experimenter
first watched the animal movie, the object movie, and the com-
bined movie for every pair. In the test phase, the experimenter
was first presented with the trigger item, before watching the
test movie. When she was subsequently presented with the test
item, she verbalized the task by saying: “Mhm, what did it like
to do? I think the elephant liked to watch television. So, I need
to point to the television here.” Then, she pointed to the televi-
sion. Subsequently, she was presented with the evaluation movie
and the evaluation item. Again, she verbalized the task by utter-
ing: “Mhm, how sure am I?” For one item she told the child that
she was sure of her answer and opted for one of the two smileys at
the top. For one item the experimenter told the child that she was
not sure and opted for one of the two smileys at the bottom, and
for one item the experimenter told the child to be a bit sure and
opted for the smiley in the middle.
Learning trials
The child was presented with the remaining 15 of the 18 items.
For every pair, she first watched the animal movie, then the object
movie, and finally the combinedmovie. No response was required
from the participant. After every pair, an X appeared on the
screen until the experimenter started the next trial by pressing the
space bar.
Test trials
Learning trials and test trials were separated by a 10-min distrac-
tor task. In every trial, participants were first presented with a
trigger item. Then, they watched the test movie. Subsequently,
they were presented with the test item. The test item remained
on the screen until the participants choose an object (i.e., ver-
bally or by pointing to one of the objects) and the experimenter
continued the study by pressing the space bar. Following the test
item, participants watched the evaluation movie and were subse-
quently presented with the evaluation item. The evaluation item
remained on the screen until the participants choose a smiley to
indicate their level of confidence and the experimenter continued
the study by pressing the space bar. Then, the next trial started.
MEASURES
Object choice
We coded whether or not participants recognized the
correct item.
Explicit confidence judgments
Participants’ explicit CJs were coded by translating their judg-
ments for the evaluation items into a scale ranging from 1 (low
confidence) to 5 (high confidence).
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Fixation time
To assess participants’ implicit confidence in the evaluation phase,
we analyzed their allocation of attention, reflected in their gaze
fixations times, to the five smileys when watching the evaluation
movie. We created same-sized areas of interest (AOIs) around
the five smileys, each covering 1.86% of the area (ca. 24,000 pix-
els). The AOIs were not adjacent to each other, creating a space
between them. We applied a standard fixation filter using a veloc-
ity threshold of 35 pixels/window and a distance threshold of 35
pixels to identify fixations. To calculate participants’ fixations on
the five smileys, we summed their total looking time on each
smiley for the evaluation movie.
Pupil size
To analyze participants’ pupil changes when presented with the
trigger item, we assessed pupil size when watching the animal
movie and when watching the trigger movie. To this end, pupil
size was exported from Tobii Studio as a text file. MATLAB was
used to process the data. For every participant, we calculated the
average pupil size for the animal movie and the trigger movie.
RESULTS
OBJECT CHOICE
Participants choose the correct item in 76% (SE = 2.3) of all
trials.
EXPLICIT CONFIDENCE JUDGMENTS
For every participant we averaged their CJs for correctly and
incorrectly remembered items. A t-test revealed that there was
no difference for correctly (M = 3.98, SE = 0.26) and incor-
rectly (M = 4.10, SE = 0.21) remembered items, t(11) = −0.609,
p = 0.56.
FIXATION TIME
To analyze implicit CJs, participants’ relative looking times on
the five smileys were converted into percentage scores for every
item. For every participant we calculated the average percent-
age looking time to each smiley for correctly and incorrectly
remembered items by dividing the looking time to each smi-
ley through the total looking time to all smileys. As for explicit
CJs, the scale ranged from smiley 1 (low confidence) to smi-
ley 5 (high confidence). Items for which no gaze on the smileys
was recorded were discarded from analysis. On average, 13 items
per child (SE = 0.59) were available for the analysis. Participants’
average looking percentages were administered to a 2 (Item:
correct vs. incorrect) × 5 (Smiley: 1–5) within-subjects analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA). This analysis yielded a main effect of
Smiley, F(4, 44) = 5.507, p = 0.001, η2 = 0.33, which was modu-
lated by an interaction between Item and Smiley, F(4, 44) = 3.926,
p < 0.01, η2 = 0.26 (for means see Figure 1). Post-hoc pair-
wise comparisons between correctly and incorrectly remembered
items for each smiley revealed that participants looked longer at
the fourth smiley for the correct than for the incorrect items,
p < 0.01 (all other ps> 0.11).Moreover, the comparisons showed
that for correct items looking times to smiley one differed from
looking times to smileys three, four, and five, all ps < 0.01, and
looking times to smiley two differed from looking times to smileys
FIGURE 1 | Percentages of children’s fixation times for the confidence
scale (smileys one to five). The relative fixation times are separately
reported for correctly and incorrectly answered items. Error bars indicate
standard errors of the means.
three, p < 0.05, four, and five, ps < 0.01 (all other ps > 0.21).
For incorrect items, the comparisons revealed that participants
looked relatively longer to smiley one than smileys two, p < 0.05,
four, and five, ps < 0.01, and to smiley two than smiley three,
p < 0.01 (all other ps> 0.05).
PUPIL SIZE
To assess whether participants’ pupil size changed from the base-
line measurement during the learning phase (i.e., animal movie)
to the test phase (i.e., trigger movie), we subtracted for every
participant the average pupil size for the animal presentation in
the learning phase (i.e., baseline assessment; animal movie) from
the pupil size for exactly the same animal presentation in the
test phase (i.e., trigger movie) for correct and incorrect items.
On average, 14.25 items per child (SE = 0.35) were available for
the analysis. One-sample t-tests against zero showed that there
was a significant enlargement of pupil size for the correct items
(M = 0.089, SE = 0.029), t(11) = 3.039, p = 0.01, but no change
for the incorrect items (M = 0.027, SE = 0.035), t(11) = 0.79,
p = 0.45.
DISCUSSION
The study aimed at investigating implicit metacognitive
monitoring abilities in 3.5-year-old children by means of an
eye-tracking paradigm. Children were presented with a paired
picture associate learning task. In the test phase, their memory
performance of the second picture was assessed when presented
with the first picture. Subsequently, they were asked to give an
explicit CJ of their memory performances while their fixation
patterns at the confidence scale were recorded. The analyses
show that participants’ explicit CJ did not differ for correctly
and incorrectly answered items. In contrast to the explicit
judgments, participants’ fixation pattern differed between the
items. Moreover, an analysis of participants’ pupil size revealed
a change from learning to test phase for correctly answered
items compared to incorrectly answered items. The results
provide some evidence for implicit metacognitive memory
monitoring processes in 3.5-year-old children and converge
with other findings (e.g., Balcomb and Gerken, 2008; Lyons
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and Ghetti, 2013) in suggesting that implicit metacognitive
abilities might precede the development of explicit metacognitive
knowledge.
The explicit CJ revealed no differences for correctly compared
to incorrectly answered items. This shows that on an explicit
level children were not able to monitor their memory perfor-
mances and could not differentiate between correct and incorrect
answers. It should be noted that children’s CJ were overall rather
high (around 4 on a scale between 1 and 5). This finding replicates
previous studies that showed on the one hand deficits in young
children’s explicit metamemory (e.g., Wellman, 1977; Lockl and
Schneider, 2002) and on the other hand overconfidence in their
own abilities and performances in young children (for a review
see Schneider and Pressley, 1997).
In contrast, an analysis of looking behavior on the CJ scale
revealed different fixation patterns for the correctly and incor-
rectly answered items. In particular, they showed that children
tended to fixate on an item representing high confidence after
having correctly answered an item than after having incor-
rectly answered an item. These findings extend behavioral studies
with same aged children (Balcomb and Gerken, 2008; Lyons
and Ghetti, 2013) and provide evidence for the presence of
implicit metacognitive monitoring abilities in preschool chil-
dren. The study relates to corresponding findings in Theory of
Mind research, where earlier competencies in implicit measures
(e.g., gaze behavior) have been reported than in explicit answers
around 3 years of age (e.g., Clements and Perner, 1994). Our
findings thereby support theoretical accounts that suggest that
metacognitive monitoring need not depend on explicit knowl-
edge about cognitive processes, but can be based on experience-
based cues during the actual learning process (Koriat, 1995,
2007).
Yet, it should be noted that the effect was restricted to the
middle range of the confidence scale. In particular we found no
difference in looking time for the smileys denoting the highest
and the lowest CJs. This corresponds partly to the findings of
Roderer and Roebers (2010) who reported no differences between
easy, difficult, and unanswerable items for the lowest part of the
confidence scale. It is possible that a bias for high confidence
ratings or a bias against low confidence ratings (also present
in children’s explicit judgments) overruled children’s differential
allocation of fixation time to the lower confidence ratings. As a
consequence, the scale could only differentiate in its middle range.
Alternatively, the result could suggest that implicit metacognitive
knowledge is still rather weak at the preschool age. For future
studies, it might be interesting to employ a scale that allows for
a better differentiation (e.g., by using 9 instead of 5 gradations).
Interestingly, measures of pupil size showed an enlargement
of pupil size when children were presented with an item they
were able to answer correctly (compared to a baseline assess-
ment). This was not the case for incorrectly answered items,
indicating that pupil changes differentiated between correctly
and incorrectly remembered items. It should be noted that this
finding cannot be explained by different pupil size for differ-
ent items (e.g., driven by differences in illumination). Given
that we compared pupil size to exactly the same items in
a baseline period and in the test phase, the findings can-
not be due to perceptual differences between remembered and
non-remembered items.
Our results show enlarged pupil size for correctly, but not
incorrectly remembered items. This relates to recent studies with
adult populations (Papesh et al., 2011) and suggests that also
in preschool children changes in pupil size reflect implicit or
preconscious cognitive processes (cf. Gredebäck and Melinder,
2011; Laeng et al., 2012). The results could be interpreted in
two ways. On the one hand, given that pupil dilations were
found for the trigger items (i.e., before participants were pre-
sented with the test movies) and given recent findings of a
relationship between pupil size during memory retrieval and
subsequent confidence ratings (Papesh et al., 2011), our results
could point to implicit abilities in preschool children to eval-
uate their performance in a memory task (i.e., knowledge
that they will or will not be able to remember the correct
items). On the other hand, given that pupil sizes were com-
pared for correct vs. incorrect items and not directly for high-
confidence vs. low-CJs, it is also possible that they merely
reflect memory processes (such as retrieval) rather than metacog-
nitive processes. Future research is needed to investigate the
role of pupil changes in preschooler’s memory processes in
greater detail.
The present study supports eye-tracking as a suitable method
to examine cognitive performances in young children (for
a review see Gredebäck et al., 2010). It extends findings
on metacognitive monitoring from school-aged children to
preschoolers (Roderer and Roebers, 2010) and relates to stud-
ies employing eye-tracking to reveal young children’s expecta-
tions and knowledge (e.g., McMurray and Aslin, 2004; Paulus,
2011; Paulus et al., 2011; Daum et al., 2012; Elsner et al.,
2012a,b). Notwithstanding the insight gained from the present
work, it is worth to point to some limitations of the study.
First, it would be interesting to examine even younger chil-
dren and to investigate whether they already show signs of
implicit metacognitive monitoring abilities. The current study
design relies on verbal instruction in the memory task and is
thus not suitable to conduct with children below the age of
3. A modified design is needed to examine the early roots of
implicit metacognitive abilities in younger children (Sodian et al.,
2012). Moreover, the current results provide only weak evi-
dence for implicit metacognitive abilities in 3.5-year-old children
as the effect was restricted to the middle range of the con-
fidence scale (i.e., smileys 3 and 4). Further research is thus
needed to clarify whether this finding is due to methodological
limitations or rather indicative for weak implicit metacognitive
abilities in 3.5-year-old children. Furthermore, on a theoret-
ical level the relation between implicit and explicit metacog-
nitive abilities needs further clarification (for discussions see
Carruthers, 2009; Perner, 2012; Proust, 2010, 2013). In partic-
ular, it would be of pivotal importance to examine longitudi-
nally whether the implicit measures as assessed in this study
relate to later explicit metacognitive knowledge. Such relations
have been reported, for example, for the development of social-
cognitive skills (e.g., Wellman et al., 2008; Thoermer et al., 2012).
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In conclusion, the present study examined early signs of
metacognitive monitoring in preschoolers by means of an eye-
tracking paradigm. The findings provide some evidence for
implicit metacognitive skills in 3.5-year-old children. It con-
verges with recent behavioral evidence (Balcomb and Gerken,
2008; Gerken et al., 2011; Lyons and Ghetti, 2013) that implicit
signs of metacognitive monitoring might precede their explicit
manifestations in verbal tasks.
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